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ABSTRACT 
The issue revolving corporate governance has always been an essential and critical 
element for both private and public sectors particularly in Malaysia. Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister has even stressed for more concentration on the issues of 
governance for the purpose of overseeing the effective running of the public and 
private sector through a check and balance system. Moreover, the Prime Minister 
argued the need of the firms in the country to benchmark to an effective system that 
emphasizes on positive issues such as ethics, openness, accountability, transparency, 
and integrity in the public and private sector. After 1998, Malaysian government 
decided to adopt corporate reform that could enhance the quality of good corporate 
management practice. This reform is clearly stated in the code and rules of 
corporate governance. This included the introduction of the new Malaysian code 
and rules for corporate governance. The debate of corporate governance in 
Malaysia are often limited to agencies involved directly in law enforcement such as 
the Ministry of Finance, Bursa Malaysia Securities, security Commission (SC) and 
Registrar of Company. Therefore, this crucial issue has to be addressed accordingly 
in order to enhance firms’ dividend payout. 
Good corporate governance is believed to be a critical factor in the improvement 
of firm value in both developing and developed financial markets. However, this 
belief overlooked the fact that the relationship between corporate governance and 
the value of a firm varies in these markets owing to the character of the corporate 
governance structures on dissimilar social, economic and regulatory conditions. 
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This reality calls for the need to examine and comprehend the differences 
affecting the firm value for the purpose of academic, financial and management 
practices and public regulation of markets and corporations. 
The core aim of the present study is the examination of the relationship between 
board characteristics and dividend payout of Malaysian firms listed on Bursa 
Malaysia with focus on the construction sector. For the purpose of the study, data 
was collected from a sample of 50 companies for the financial year of 2010 with 
elimination of other 56 firms that they did not pay dividend. Among corporate 
governance’s various variables, seven were chosen to be included in the study. 
They were board size, board composition, CEO duality, family linked 
companies, board of director ethnicity, gender of board of director, and 
managerial ownership. Other financial measurements (investment 
opportunity set, firm leverage, firm size, and firm performance) were also 
tested against dividend payout. 
Regression analysis was utilized for the examination of the relationship between 
board characteristics and firm dividend payout. The result indicates that the 
relationships between investment opportunity set, firm size, firm performance, and 
managerial ownership and dividend payout are positive, but not significant. Firm 
leverage, board size, board composition, family linked, ethnicity of board of 
director, and gender of board of director are negatively insignificantly correlated to 
dividend payout. CEO duality and dividend payout is also negatively correlated but the 
relationship is significant. Finally, this study is using the firm leverage, firm size, firm 
performance, and CEO duality role as control variables against dividend payout. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 background 
Businesses around the world require development and growth in order to attract 
funding from investors. Before they invest in a particular business, investors 
normally make sure that the business in question is financially secure and stable and 
possesses the ability to produce profits in the long run (Mallin, 2007). Hence, in 
instances where the company position is not as promising, it will not be as attractive 
to investors as it hopes to be. This failure to attract enough capital normally leads to 
negative consequences for the business in particular and for the economy in general. 
Looking at local and global economic situation, it has been noticed that the economic 
situation is unstable. Uncertainty of the future of economies is high. However, 
property sector maybe is more secure and has less variability than other sectors. 
According to MBAM (Master Builders Association Malaysia) outlook, construction 
sector will keep stable in the future. 
Abu Mansor (2010), explained that while all other sectors recorded negative growth 
in 2009, construction sector was the only sector that recorded a positive growth in 
2009, during every quarter.  The importance of construction sectors comes as it is 
considered as a contributor segment in the Malaysian economy, due to the interaction 
with other industries.  
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
 89 
5.6 References 
A Kyereboah-Coleman, N. B. (2005). Corporate governance and the performance of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Ghana. Working paper, 1-25. 
Abu Mansor, Y. B. (2010). The 7th Malaysia Construction Sector Review And 
Outlook Seminar. Minister of Works Malaysia, 1-7. 
Adam, T., & Goyal, K. V. (2007). The Investment Opportunity Set and its Proxy 
Variables. Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - 
Department of Finance, 1-29. 
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on 
governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94, 291–309. 
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2004). Gender Diversity in the Boardroom. Finance 
Working Paper, 58, 1-32. 
Afzal, M., & Sehrish, S. (2010). Ownership Structure, Board Composition and 
Dividend Policy in Pakistan. COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, 
Islamabad - Pakistan, 24. 
Alexander, J., Fennell, M., & Halpern, M. (1993). Leadership instability in hospitals: 
the influence of board-CEO relations and organization growth and decline. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 74-99. 
Alhabshi, S. O. (1994). Corporate Ethics in the Management of Corporations. The 
Malaysian Accountant, 24. 
Alsaeed, K. (2006). The association between firm-specific characteristics and 
disclosure: The case of Saudi Arabia. Managerial Auditing Journal, 476-496. 
Amarjit Gill, N. B. (2010). States, Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios: 
Evidence from United. The Open Business Journal, 8-14. 
Amidu, M., & Abor, J. (2006). Determinants of dividend payout ratios in Ghana. 
Journal of Risk Finance, 7(2), 136 - 145. 
Anderson, R., & Reeb, D. (2003). Founding-Family Ownership and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. The Journal of Finance, 58 (3), 
1301-1328. 
Ang, J., Coles, R., & Wuh-Lin, J. (2000). Agency costs and ownership structure. 
Journal of Finance, 55 No. 1, 81-107. 
 90 
Anil, K., & Kapoor, S. (2008). Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios-A Study of 
Indian Information Technology Sector. International Research Journal of 
Finance and Economics, 63-71. 
Arfken, D. E., Bellar, S. L., & Helms, M. M. (2004). The Ultimate Glass Ceiling 
Revisited: The Presence of Women on Corporate Boards. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 50, 177-186. 
Arussi, A. S., Selamat, M. H., & Hanefah, M. M. (2009). Determinants of financial 
and environmental disclosures through the internet by Malaysian companies. 
Asian Review of Accounting, 17 No. 1, 59-76. 
Baber, W., Janakiraman, S., & Kang, S. (1996). Investment opportunities and the 
structure of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
297-318. 
Badrinath, S., & Gay, G. (1989). Patterns of institutional investment, prudence, and 
the managerial" safety-net" hypothesis. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 605–
629. 
Baker HK, F. G. (1985). A survey of management views on dividend policy. Finance 
Manage. 
Baker, H., & Powell, G. (2000). Determinants of corporate dividend policy: a survey 
of NYSE firms. Finance Practice Education, 29-40. 
Baker, H., Farrelly, G., & Edelman, R. (1985). A survey of management views on 
dividend policy. Financial Management, 14(3), 78-84. 
Baliga, R. B., Moyer, C. R., & Rao, R. B. (1996). CEO duality and firm 
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 41-53. 
Barclay, M. J., Clifford W. Smith, J., & Ross L. Watts. (1992). The Determinants Of 
Corporate Leverage And Dividend Policies. Journal of Finanical Economics, 
263-292. 
Baysinger, B., & Butler, H. (1985). Corporate governance and board of directors: 
performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, 101-124. 
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2005). Corporate Governance and Control. ECGI 
Working Paper Series in Finance, 1-122. 
Bhagat, S., & Black, S. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and 
long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 231-274. 
 91 
Bhaskaran, & Sukumaran. (2007). National culture, business culture and 
management practices: consequential relationships? Cross Cultural 
Management: An International Journal, 14, No 1, 54-67. 
Billet, M., King, D., & Mauer, D. (2007). Growth Opportunities and the Choice of 
Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Covenants. Journal of, 135-157. 
Brammer, S. M. (2007). Gender and ethnic diversity among UK corporate boards. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15, 393–403. 
Brook, Y., Chalton, W., & Hendershott, R. (1998). Do firms use dividends to signal 
large future cash flow increase? Finance Manage, 46-57. 
Brown, J. R., Liang, N., & Weisbenner, S. (2007). Executive Financial Incentives 
and Payout Policy: Firm Response to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut. Journal of 
Finance, 62, 1935-1965. 
Campbell, K., & Minguez-Vera. (2008). Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm 
financial performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 83, 435–451. 
Carter, D. A., D’Souza, F., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2010). The Gender 
and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm 
Financial Performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
18(5), 396–414. 
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2003). Corporate governance, board 
diversity, and firm value. Financial Review, 38, 33–53. 
CheAhmad, A., & Houghton. (2001). The effect of ethnicity on audit pricing. 
working paper, Universiti Utara, Malaysia and University of Melbourne, 
Melbourne. 
Chuah, B. H. (1995). The Unique Breed of Malaysian Managers. Management 
Times, New Straits Times Press Malaysia. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., & Lang, L. (2002). Disentangling the incentive 
and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. The Journal of Finance, 
2741–2771. 
Claude, F., Re´al, L., & Bernard, S.-D. (2008). Gender Diversity in Corporate 
Governance and Top Management. Journal of Business Ethics, 81, 83-95. 
Coles, B., & Jarrell, G. (2001). Leadership structure: separating the CEO and 
chairman of the board. Journal of Corporate Finance, 189-220. 
 92 
Crutchley, C. E., & Hansen, R. S. (1989). A Test of the Agency Theory of 
Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and Corporate Dividends. 
Financial Management, 18, No. 4, 36-46. 
D’Souza, J., & Saxena, A. K. (1999). Agency cost, market risk, investment 
opportunities and dividend policy-an international perspective”. Managerial 
Finance, 35-43. 
Dhillon, U. (1986). Corporate ownership, dividend policy, and capital structure 
under asymmetric information. Louisiana State: Louisiana State University 
and Agricultural & Mechanical College. 
Dimitrios, K. N., Chris, O., & Maria, A. (2009). Emerald Article: Board 
characteristics and involvement in strategic decision making: The Nigerian 
perspective. Management Research News, 169 - 184. 
Donaldson, L. (1990). The Ethereal Hand: Organizational Economics and 
Management Theory. Academy of Management Review, 369-81. 
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984). Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends. The 
American Economic Review, 650-659. 
Ehikioya. (2007). Board composition, managerial ownership, and firm performance: 
An empirical analysis. The Financial Review, 1-16. 
Ehrhardt, O., & Nowak, E. (2001). Private benefits and minority shareholder 
expropriation: empirical evidence from IPOs of German family-owned firms. 
Center for Financial Studies Working Paper. 
Eichenseher, J. (1995). Additional factors in audit pricing: new evidence from 
Malaysia. Accounting & Business Review, 2, No. 1, 1-26. 
Elsaid, E., & Ursel, N. D. (2011). CEO succession, gender and risk taking. Gender in 
Management: An International Journal, 27, issue 7, 499 - 512. 
Elton, E. J. (1970). Marginal stockholder tax rates and the clientele effect. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 68–74. 
Erhardt, N. L., Werbel, J. D., & Shrader, C. B. (2003). Board of Director Diversity 
and Firm Financial Performance. Board of Director Diversity and Firm 
Financial Performance, 11, 102-111. 
Esterbrook, F. H., Grossman, S. J., Hart, O. D., & Jensen, M. C. (1984; 1980; 1986). 
Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends; Tackover Bids, The Free-Rider 
Problem, and the Theory of the Corproration; Agency Costs of Free Cash 
Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. The American Economic Review; 
 93 
The Bell Journal of Economics; American Economic Review, 650-659; 42-64; 
323-329. 
Fama, & Jensen. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 301-325. 
Farinha, J. (2003). Corporate governance: A survey of the literature. SSRN, working 
paper, series No, 470801. 
Farrell, K. A. (2005). Additions to corporate boards:The effect of gender. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 58, 85–106. 
Farrell, K. A., & Hersch, P. L. (2001). Additions to Corporate Boards: Does Gender 
Matter. Working Paper, 1-30. 
Farrella, K. A., & Hersch, P. L. (2005). Additions to corporate boards: the effect of 
gender. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11, 85-106. 
Fatimah, Nor, Sharifah, & NoorRaida. (2011). The Impact of Company and Board 
Characteristics on Earnings Management: Evidence from Malaysia. College 
of Business Management & Accounting, Universiti Tenaga Nasional, 1-16. 
Feng, Z., Ghosh, C., & Sirmans, C. F. (2004). CEO Involvement in Director 
Selection: Implications for REIT Dividend Policy. Journal of Real Estate 
Portfolio, 1-26. 
Fiedler, F. E. (1967). A theory of leadership effectiveness. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Forsberg, R. (1989). Outside directors and managerial monitoring. Journal Business 
and Economic Review, 24-32. 
Ghosh, C., & Sirmans, C. F. (2004). Do Managerial Motives Impact Dividend 
Decisions in REITs? USA: Real Estate and Urban Economic Studies 
(CREUES) and the Department of Finance. 
Gill, A., Biger, N., & Tibrewala, R. (2010). Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios: 
Evidence from United States. The Open Business Journal, 8-14. 
Gill, A., Biger, N., & Tibrewala, R. (2010). States, Determinants of Dividend Payout 
Ratios: Evidence from United. The Open Business Journal, 8-14. 
Gomez, E., & Jomo, K. (1997). Malaysia’s Political Economy; Politics, Patronage 
and Profits. 1st edition Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gordon, M. J. (1962). The Investment, Financing and Valuation of the Corporation. 
Greenwood Press (Westport, Conn.). 
 94 
Goyal, V. K., & Park, C. W. (2004). Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 49-66. 
Grossman, H. .. (2000). Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives in J 
McCall (ed.). The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago.  
Hair, A., Tatham, R., & Black, W. (1995). Multivariate data analysis (4th edition). 
Working Paper.  
Haniffa, R. M., & Cooke, T. E. (2002). Culture, Corporate Governance and 
Disclosure in Malaysian Corporations. ABACUS, 38, No. 3, 317-349. 
Haniffa, R., & Cooke, T. (2000). Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in 
Malaysian Corporations. Presented at the Asian AAA World Conference (pp. 
1-36). Singapore: Exeter University. 
Haniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2006). Corporate governance structure and performance 
of Malaysian listed companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
1034-1062. 
Harada, K., & Nguyen, P. (2006). Ownership concentration, agency conflicts, and 
dividend policy in Japan. Graduate School of International Accounting, Chuo 
University, Tokyo 162-8473, Japan; School of Banking and Finance, 
University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia, 1-25. 
Hermalin, B., & Weisbach, M. (1991). The effects of board composition and direct 
incentives on firm performance. Journal of Financial Management, 101-112. 
Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. London: 
McGraw Hill. 
Ibrahim, H., & Abdul Samad, F. (2001). Corporate Governance Mechanisms and 
Performance of Public-Listed Family-Ownership in Malaysia. International 
Journal of Economics and Finance, 105-115. 
Jensen, M. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal 
control systems. Journal of Finance, 831-880. 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers. The American Economic Review, 323-329. 
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Financial Economics, 305-360. 
John, L. &. (1956). Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividens, 
Retained Earnings, and Taxes. The American Economic Review, 97-113. 
 95 
Kang, D. (2000). Family ownership and performance in public corporations: a study 
of US fortune 500. working paper, Division of Research, Harvard Business 
School, Boston, MA, 1982-1994. 
Khan, H. (1999). Corporate Governance of Family Businesses in Asia: What’s Right 
and What’s Wrong? The World Bank Working Paper, 1-42. 
Kiel, G., & Nicholson, C. (2003). CEO duality and organizational performance: a 
longitudinal analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 55-60. 
Klapper, L., & Love, S. (2004). Corporate governance, investor protection and firm 
performance in emerging markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3(1), 1-26. 
Klein, W. (1998). Firm performance and board committee structure. Journal of Law 
& Economics, 275-303. 
Kosnik, R. (1987). Corporate governance; Directors-of-corporations. Administrative 
Science Quarterly Journal, 163 - 185. 
Kyereboah-Coleman, & Biekpe, N. (2008). The relationship between board size, 
board composition, CEO duality and firm performance: Experience from 
Ghana. Journal of Corporate Ownership and Control, 114-122. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000a). Agency 
problems and dividend policies around the world. Journal of Finance, 55 no. 
1, 1-33. 
Lau, D. C., & Murnighan. (1998). Demographic diversity and faultlines: The 
compositional dynamics of organizational groups. Academy of Management 
Review, 325–340. 
Lawrence, P., & Lorsch. (1967). Organization and environment. Boston: Harvard 
University Press. 
Lee, S. S. (2009). Dividend Policy. Management accounting and finance. 
Lemmon, M., & Lins, K. (2003). Ownership structure, corporate governance, and 
firm value: evidence from East Asian financial crisis'. The Journal of 
Finance, 45–68. 
Li, C. A., & Wearing, B. (2004). Between Glass Ceilings: Female Non-Executive 
Directors in UK Quoted Companies. International Journal of Disclosure and 
Governance, 355-370. 
Li, D., Moshirian, P., Pham, K., & Zein. (2006). When financial institutions are large 
shareholders: The role of macro corporate governance environments. Journal 
of Finance, 2975 - 3007. 
 96 
Limpaphayom, J., & Connelly, P. (2006). Board characteristics and firm 
performance: Evidence from the life insurance industry in Thailand 
Chulalongkorn. Journal of Economics, 16(2), 101-124. 
Lintner, J. (1962). Dividends, Earnings, Leverage, Stock Prices and the Supply of 
Capital to Corporations. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 243-269. 
Mak, Y., & Yuan, L. (2001). Determinants of corporate ownership and board 
structure: Evidence from Singapore. Journal of Corporate Finance, 236-256. 
Mak, Y., & Yuan, L. (2001). Determinants of corporate ownership and board 
structure: Evidence from Singapore. Journal of Corporate Finance, 236-256. 
Malaysia, D. o. (2004). (1st Quarter) Unpublished Key Statistic, Department of 
Statistics Malaysia. National Accounts and Expenditure Accounts. 
Mallin, C. (2007). Corporate governance (2nd ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mehrani, S., Moradi, M., & Eskandar, H. (2011). Ownership structure and dividend 
policy: Evidence from Iran. African Journal of Business Management, 5(17), 
7516-7525. 
Michael, J. B., Clifford, W. S., & and Ross, L. W. (1995). The Determinants Of 
Corporate Leverage and Dividend Policies. The Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, 7(5), 4-19. 
Miles, M. (2009). Corporate Governance in Asia's Emerging Markets - an Overview. 
Review of International Comparative Management, 1-10. 
Miller, Merton, & Modigliani, F. (1961). Dividend Policy, Growth, and the 
Valuation of Shares. the journal of business, 34, 411-433. 
Mishra, C., Randoy, T., & Jenssen, J. (2001). he Effect of Founding Family Influence 
on Firm Value and Corporate Governance. Journal of International Financial 
Management and Accounting, 235-259. 
Mitton, T. (2004). Corporate governance and dividend policy in emerging markets. 
Emerging Markets Review, 409-426. 
Morck, R., & Yeung, B. (2003). Agency problems in large family business groups. 
Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 67-82. 
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 147-175. 
 97 
Naser, A., Khalid, M., & Karbhari, Y. (2002). Empirical evidence on the depth of 
corporate information disclosure in developing countries: The case of Jordan. 
International journal of commerce and management, 12(4), 122-155. 
OCDE, O. P. (2003, may). Relatório oficial sobre governança corporativana 
América Latina. Translation by Pinheiro Neto Advogados, Danvers – USA: 
OCDE. Retrieved from www.oecd.org/daf/corporate-affairs 
Omran, M., & Pointon, J. (2004). Dividend policy, trading characteristics, and share 
prices: empirical evidence from Egyptian firms. International Jornal or 
Theoretical and Applied Finance, 7(2), 121-133. 
Pearce, J., & Zahra, S. (1992). Board Composition from a strategic contingency 
perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 411-438. 
Pettigrew, A. M. (1979). On Studying Organizational Cultures. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 24, No. 4. 
Pfeffer, J. (1973). Size, composition, and function of hospital boards of directors. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 349-364. 
Prabowo, M., & Simpson, J. (2011). Independent directors and firm performance in 
family controlled firms: evidence from Indonesia. ASIAN-PACIFIC 
ECONOMIC LITERATURE, 121-132. 
Pruitt, S., & Gitman, L. (1991). The interactions between the investment, financing, 
and dividend decisions of major US firms. Financial Review, 26(3), 409-430. 
Ramdani, D., & Witteloostuijn, A. v. (2010). Board independence, CEO duality and 
firm performance: A quantile regression analysis for Indonesia, Malaysia, 
South Korea and Thailand. British Academy of Management, 1467-8551. 
Rechner, P. L., & Dalton, D. R. (1991). CEO duality and organizational 
performance: a longitudinal analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 155-
160. 
Redding, L. S. (1997). Firm Size and Dividend Payouts. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 224–248. 
Renée, A. B., & Mehran, H. (2005). Corporate Performance, Board Structure and its 
Determinants in the Banking Industry. Moscow Meetings, 1-42. 
Rice, H., & Alabama, A. (2006). What Price Greed: An Analysis of corporate abuse 
and mismanagement by fiduciaries. Global Conference oil Business & 
Economics, 3(1), 1-13. 
 98 
Rose, C. (2007). Does female board representation influence firm performance? The 
Danish evidence. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 404–413. 
Rozeff, M. S. (1982). Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend 
Payout Ratios. The Journal of Financial Research, 249-259. 
Salleh, Z., Stewart, J., & Manson, S. (2006). The Impact of Board Composition and 
Ethnicity on Audit Quality: Evidence from Malaysian Companies. Malaysian 
Accounting Review, 5, No 2, 61-83. 
Sanda, A., Mukaila, S., & Garba, T. (2003). Corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm financial performance in Nigeria. Final Report Presented to the 
Biannual Research Workshop of the AERC, Nairobi, Kenya, 24-29. 
Selvarajan, M., & Kiel, J. (2007). Higher market valuation of companies with a small 
board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 185-221. 
Sendut, H. (1991). Managing in a Multicultural Society: The Malaysian Experience. 
Malaysian Management Review. 
Setia-Atmaja, L. (2010). Dividend and debt policies of family controlled firms. 
International Journal of Managerial Finance, 6 No. 2, 128-142. 
SG Badrinath, G. G. (1989). Patterns of institutional investment, prudence, and the 
managerial" safety-net" hypothesis. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 605–629. 
Shah, S. Z., & Ullah, W. (2010). Impact Of Ownership Structure On Dividend Policy 
Of Firm (Evidence From Pakistan). International Conference on E-business, 
Management and Economics, 3, 22-26. 
Shakir, R. (2008). Board size, executive directors and property firm performance in 
MalaysiA. Pacific Rim Property Research Journal. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of 
Finance, 5(52), 737-783. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., & Morck, R. (1988). Management ownership and market 
valuation: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 293–315. 
Shrader, C. B., Blackburn, V. B., & Iles. (1997). Women in management and firm 
financial performance: An exploratory study. Journal of Managerial Issues, 
355–372. 
Sinn, H.-W. (1991). The vanishing Harberger triangle. Journal of Public Economic, 
271–300. 
 99 
Smith, N., Smith, V., & Verner, M. (2006). Do women in top management affect 
firm performance? A panel study of 2500 Danish firms. International Journal 
of Productivity and Performance Management, 55, 569–593. 
Snow, & Hrebiniak. (1980). Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency 
problems between manager and shareholders. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 377-389. 
Statistics, M. D. (2004). (1st Quarter) Unpublished Key Statistic, Department of 
Statistics Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: National Accounts and Expenditure 
Accounts. 
Stiglitz, J. (1973). Taxation, corporate financial policy, and the cost of capital. 
Journal of Public Economic, 1–34. 
Subramaniam, R. K., & Shaiban, M. S. (2011). Investment opportunity set and 
dividend policy in Malaysia: Some evidence on the role of ethnicity and 
family control. 2nd International Conference on Economics, Business and 
Management (pp. 170-177). singapore: IACSIT Press. 
Subramaniam, R., & Devi, S. S. (2010). Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy 
in Malaysia. International Conference on Business and Economics Research, 
200-207. 
Tabalujan, B. (2002). Family capitalism and corporate governance of family-
controlled listed companies in Indonesia. University of New South Wales Law 
Journal, 486–514. 
Terjesen, S., Sealy, R., & Singh, V. (2009). Women directors on corporate boards: A 
review and research agenda. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 17, 320–337. 
Vafeas, N., & Theodorou, E. (1998). The relationship between board structure and 
firm performance in the UK. Retrieved from 
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/1141a240336c1eb91a375d31.html 
Van Fossen, A. (1998). Race, Ethnicity and Language’, in R. Maidment and C. 
Mackerras (eds). Culture and Society in the Asia-Pacific, 24. 
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and 
management affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 385-417. 
Vinten, G. (1998). orporate governance: An international state of the art. Managerial 
Auditing Journal, 13(7), 419-431. 
 100 
Wan Fauziah, W. Y. (2011). DOES ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE INFLEUNCE 
FIRM PERFORMANCE IN MALAYSIA? International Journal of 
Multidisciplinary Research, 1, issue 3, 1-12. 
Wang, Y., & Clift, B. (2009). Emerald Article: Is there a "business case" for board 
diversity? Pacific Accounting Review, 21, 1, 88 - 103. 
Watch, M. (2012). Construction Industry in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: The German 
Chamber Network. 
Westhead, P., & Cowling, M. (1997). Performance contrasts between family and 
non-family unquoted companies in the UK. International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research, 3 No. 1, 30-52. 
White, J., & Ingrassia, P. (1992). Board ousts managers at GM: takes control of 
crucial committee. The Wall Street Journal, 15-31. 
White, W. L. (1964). The Debt-Equity Ratio, the Dividend Payout Ratio, Growth and 
the Rate at Which Earnings Are Capitalized: An Empirical Study. School of 
Industrial Management, 52-64. 
Wright, M. H. (2005). The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm 
performance. Financial Management. 
Yan, Z. J. (2007). Audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal 
control weaknesses. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 300-327. 
Yarram, S. R. (2010). Board Characteristics and Dividend Policy: Australian 
Evidence. Economics and Public Policy, 1-21. 
Yatim, P., Kent, P., & Clarkson, P. (2006). Governance structures, ethnicity, and 
audit fees of Malaysian listed firms. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21, No. 7, 
757-782. 
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of 
directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 185-221. 
Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial 
Performance: A Review and Integrative Model. Journal of Management, 411-
438. 
Zsuzsanna, F., & Stewart, C. (1998; 2000). Optimal Financial Contracting Debt 
versus Outside Equity; Outside Equity. The Review of Financial Studies; the 
Journal of Finance, 383-418; 1005-1037. 
